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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20010268-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) this Court has jurisdiction in 
criminal cases where defendant has been convicted of a first degree felony offense and 
the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. In the 
underlying proceedings, Appellant/Defendant Jesus Isreal Rosillo was convicted of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999). The judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the matter to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury at the conclusion of trial on the lesser-included offense of robbery. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews a trial court's refusal to give a jury 
instruction for correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992); see also State v. Kruger. 2000 UT 60, fl 1, 6 
P.3d 1116 (citing Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238). Also, in considering whether defendant 
was entitled to have the jury instructed on a lesser-included offense, this Court will view 
the evidence and inferences that can be drawn from the evidence "in the light most 
favorable to the defense." State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983); Kruger, 2000 
UT60,1J14. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue was preserved in the record on appeal ("R.") at 78 and 145:53-54. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). 
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On August 23, 2000, the state filed an Information against Rosillo, charging him 
with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense. (R. 4-6.) After a preliminary 
hearing (see R. 143 (dated September 19, 2000)), Rosillo was bound over for trial on the 
charge. On November 28, 2000, the trial court commenced a three-day jury trial in the 
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case (R. 83-90; 144-146), and on November 30, 2000, the jury returned a verdict of guilty 
on the charged offense. (R. 146:3-5; 87-88; 116.) On January 12, 2001, the trial court 
entered judgment against Rosillo and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 
six years to life. (R. 119-20.) Rosillo is appealing from the entry of judgment. (See R. 
124-25.) He is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state presented evidence at trial as follows. On August 18, 2000, at 
approximately 2:00 in the morning, Steven Lund, a shuttle van driver for the Embassy 
Suites Hotel, was vacuuming out the van at the Ute Car Wash on the corner of 300 South 
and 300 East in Salt Lake City. (R. 144:12-14.) While Lund was halfway inside the van, 
two men approached him from behind. (R. 144:15.) Lund emerged from the van, turned 
around, and observed the men standing next to each other, about five feet from him. (R. 
144:15-16.) One of the men, who was later identified as Andrew Mallory (R. 144:51), 
was pointing a gun at Lund, "waist level." (R. 144:16.) 
Lund testified that the second man, identified as Rosillo (R. 144:16-17), said to 
him, "Give me your money." (R. 144:17.) Lund reached into his back pocket, pulled out 
a wad of cash, and handed the money to Rosillo. (R. 144:17) Rosillo put the money "in 
his pocket." (R. 144:17.) According to Lund, Rosillo spoke to Lund a second time and 
told Lund to "give him the rest, or give him the wallet." (R. 144:18.) Lund again 
reached into his back pocket. He pulled out his wallet and handed it to Rosillo. (R. 
3 
144:18.) Lund testified that Rosillo took the wallet, opened it up and looked inside it. 
(Id.) During the encounter, Mallory did not say anything (R. 144:17, 19). In addition, 
Rosillo and Mallory did not say anything to each other. (R. 144:19.) Thereafter, Rosillo 
and Mallory turned around and walked away. (R. 144:19.) 
Lund testified that he continued to vacuum the van (R. 144:20), then he drove back 
to the hotel. En route, he called a person at the hotel by two-way radio and asked her to 
call police to report the robbery. (R. 144:21.) When Lund arrived at the hotel, he 
described what happened and he gave a description of the suspects to police. (Id.) 
According to the evidence, the Ute Car Wash was located approximately a block 
from the police station in downtown Salt Lake. (R. 144:61.) The evidence showed that 
the suspects lived in an apartment building somewhere between the car wash and the 
police station. Shortly after the robbery, the suspects were seen at the apartment complex 
getting into a taxi cab. (See R. 144:62; 144:45-46; 144:72,) A police dispatcher provided 
information about the taxi cab to responding officers. 
Within 10 or 15 minutes of the initial dispatch on the robbery, Officer Carter 
observed the taxi cab in the area of State Street and North Temple. Carter and a second 
police unit, Officer Hamideh, initiated a felony traffic stop and when the cab pulled over 
and stopped, the officers ordered the passengers out of the cab. (R. 144:47; 144:62-64.) 
According to Carter and Hamideh, the passengers matched the descriptions of the robbery 
suspects. (R. 144:48; 144:64.) The officers frisked the suspects for weapons and 
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obtained consent to search their pockets, discovering approximately $150-$ 169 on each 
person. (R. 144:49-50; 144:66-68.) Officers also recovered from Mallory a driver's 
license, credit cards and personal items belonging to Lund. (R. 144:51; 144:66-67.) 
Thereafter, Officer Daniel Delha took Lund to West Temple to identify the 
suspects. (R. 144:21-22; 144:73.) Lund identified Rosillo as the suspect who spoke to 
him, and Mallory as the suspect with the gun. (R. 144:22-23; 144:73-74.) Lund also 
recognized the driver's license and other items recovered from Mallory's possession as 
his. (R. 144:25.) 
Meanwhile, Officer Zane Swim went to the apartment complex where the suspects 
were seen getting into a cab, and he and two other officers contacted a resident in apart-
ment 22. (R. 144:77-78.) The resident identified herself asRosillo's wife. (R. 144:78-
79.) Swim explained that Rosillo had been picked up for possible involvement in a 
robbery and he requested permission to search the apartment. (R. 144:79.) Mrs. Rosillo 
provided consent, and Swim testified that he found a gun with a wallet sitting on top of it 
in a closet. (R. 144:79-80.) Lund identified the wallet as his. (R. 144:25.) 
After the state presented its evidence in the case, Rosillo testified. He stated that 
he had moved into the apartment complex on 200 South and 300 East days before the 
robbery in August 2000 (R. 145:6) and that he offered to let Mallory and his family live 
there until they could find their own place to live. (R. 145:8.) On August 18, 2000, 
Rosillo and Mallory were on their way to a 7-Eleven convenience store in the neighbor-
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hood to get something to eat. (R. 145:10.) They were talking about the rent for the 
apartment, and Mallory promised that he would give money for rent to Rosillo. (Id, at 11.) 
As the men were walking by the car wash, Mallory said, "Let's rob somebody." 
He then pulled something out of his pants and began to approach Lund. (R. 145:11.) 
Rosillo testified that as Lund turned around, Rosillo saw that Mallory had a gun. (R. 
145:12.) According to Rosillo, Mallory said to Lund, "[G]ive me your money," and Lund 
began searching his pockets. (R. 145:14; 145:29.) Lund then pulled out a wad of cash 
and his wallet and handed them to Rosillo. (R. 145:14.) 
Rosillo took the items from Lund because he felt he did not have a choice. (R. 
145:15.) He was afraid that Mallory may shoot somebody if Rosillo did not accept the 
money from Lund, and Rosillo wanted to keep things calm. (R. 145:15; 145:19; 145:31.) 
Thereafter, Rosillo turned around and walked away as quickly as he could toward his 
apartment building. Mallory caught up to Rosillo and requested the wallet and money. 
(R. 145:15.) Rosillo gave the items to him. (R. 145:15.) 
When Rosillo and Mallory reached the apartment, Rosillo told Mallory that he 
could not stay with Rosillofs family; Mallory and his family would have to leave. (R. 
145:16.) Mallory left the room to talk to his wife, and shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mallory 
came out and handed $150 to Rosillo for rent. Mrs. Mallory asked to stay at the 
apartment, and Rosillo told them both they had to leave by morning. (R. 145:16.) 
Rosillo then tried to call his uncle, who lived on 700 North Redwood Road. (R. 
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145:16-17.) He wanted to tell his uncle what happened, and to ask his uncle to stay with 
his family at the apartment to help him keep Mallory out. (R. 145:16-17.) When Rosillo 
could not reach his uncle by phone, he called for a taxi to go to his uncle's house. (R. 
145:17.) The taxi arrived and both Rosillo and Mallory got into it. Rosillo decided that 
he would drop Mallory off somewhere along the way to get him out of the apartment. (R. 
145:18-19; 145:37.) 
The taxi cab was en route to the uncle's house when officers initiated the felony 
traffic stop. Rosillo testified that he got out of the car at the officers' request and told 
them what happened. (R. 145:18; see also 145:44-45.) 
The defense requested an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery. 
(R. 78; 145:53.) The trial court denied the request. (R. 145:53-54.) After the jury was 
instructed on the matter, the jury began deliberations on November 29, 2000, at 1:20 p.m. 
(R. 145:85.) On November 30, 2000, the jury reached a verdict of guilty as charged. (R. 
146:4-5.) Additional facts relating to this appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During trial, Rosillo requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of robbery. The trial court denied the request. The trial court's ruling was 
in error since the elements of aggravated robbery and robbery overlap. That is, both 
aggravated robbery and robbery require proof that defendant, as a party to the offense, 
unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession 
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of another from his person or immediate presence, against his will and by means of force 
or fear. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 and -302. For aggravated robbery, the state was 
required to establish an additional element as it related to the defendant: that "he use[d] or 
threaten[ed] to use a dangerous weapon" in the commission of the robbery, id at -302. 
In this case, Rosillo provided evidence at trial to support that he was not an 
accomplice to the aggravated robbery; he did not "use[] or threaten[] to use a dangerous 
weapon." In addition, Utah law does not make Rosillo automatically liable for the 
criminal intent and conduct of Mallory in using a weapon during the commission of the 
offense. The evidence and the law in this case supported an acquittal on the greater 
offense and a conviction on the lesser-included offense. Rosillo was entitled to have his 
theory of the case presented to the jury in the form of the lesser-included-offense 
instruction. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1986). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ROBBERY, 
Utah appellate courts have ruled that when a defendant requests a jury instruction 
on a lesser-included offense, the trial court must provide the instruction if "(i) the 
statutory elements of greater and lesser included offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) 
the evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense.1" Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (quoting 
State v.Baker. 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983V): see State v. Evans. 2001 UT22,^fl8,20 
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P.3d 888; State v. Jones. 878 P.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Code Ann. 
§76-l-402(3)(a)(1999). 
That two-part analysis constitutes the "evidence-based" standard for determining 
whether a trial court must instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense. Baker, 671 P.2d at 
158; Jones. 878 P.2d at 1177; Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^ [12 (when a lesser included 
instruction is requested by defendant, the trial court must apply an "evidence-based" 
standard to decide whether the instruction is appropriate) (citing State v. Piansiaksone, 
954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998)). 
A. THE FIRST PART OF THE BAKER ANALYSIS IS ESTABLISHED: THE 
STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND ROBBERY 
OVERLAP. 
In considering whether the elements of the greater and lesser offenses overlap, this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have specified that the analysis begins with the proof 
of facts to be established for each offense. Baker. 671 P.2d at 158; see also CricL 675 
P.2d at 529; Jones, 878 P.2d at 1177; Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a). That is, if the 
instruction sought by the defendant is for an offense that " is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the [greater, 
charged offense],' then the offense [in the requested instruction] is a lesser included 
offense." Jones. 878 P.2d at 1177 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a); State v. 
Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986)).1 
In considering the matter in this case, the state charged Rosillo with aggravated 
robbery under an accomplice liability theory. (R. 4-6.) To establish that offense, the state 
was required to prove the elements for accomplice liability: that "[e]very person, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); (see also R. 105 (jury 
instructed on accomplice liability theory); 103 (jury instructed that it must not be 
concerned with co-defendant Mallory in assessing Rosillo's liability).) 
In addition, under the aggravated robbery statute, the state was required to 
establish that as a party to the offense, defendant "in the course of committing robbery . . . 
use[d] or threatenjed] to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(a) (1999); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(recognizing that to establish aggravated robbery as an accomplice, state must establish 
elements set forth at aggravated robbery statute, § 76-6-302(1), and accomplice liability 
1 Section 76-1-402 provides in relevant part the following: 
(3)... An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; 
* * * 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
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statute, § 76-2-202); State v. Labrumu 959 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (under 
accomplice liability statute for attempted homicide, where a party did not actually engage 
in shooting, the state was required to show that the party both had the required mental 
state for the charged offense, and he directly committed the shooting, or solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the shooting), 
cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); (R. 104 (instructions to the jury defined aggravated 
robbery as a party to the offense); 108 (elements instruction for aggravated robbery).) A 
complete set of the instructions provided to the jury in this case is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. 
At trial, Rosillo requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of robbery and provide the jury with that alternative as a basis for 
conviction. (R. 78 and 145:53-54.) Under the robbery statute, the state would be required 
to show that as a party to the offense, defendant "unlawfully and intentionally [took] or 
attempted] to take personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-301(l)(a) (1999); (R. 78). A copy of the instruction proposed by Rosillo concerning 
the lesser-included offense of robbery is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
Under Utah statutory law and case law, aggravated robbery and robbery are related 
where statutory elements overlap and they require proof of some of the same facts at trial. 
See State v. Jensen. 818 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that the offenses of 
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aggravated robbery and robbery are obviously related where the only difference between 
the offenses is defendant's use of a weapon under the aggravated robbery statute); State v. 
HilL 674 P.2d 96, 96-98 (Utah 1983) (recognizing that theft is a lesser-included offense 
of aggravated robbery); State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1990) (recognizing 
that "possession of a stolen vehicle is a lesser included offense of theft of a vehicle"); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (an offense is included when it is established by proof 
of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the charged 
offense); compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (aggravated robbery occurs when a person 
has committed robbery and has used or threatened the use of a weapon) with Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-301. 
In this case, it is obvious that the statutory elements for robbery are included in the 
offense for aggravated robbery, placing the offenses in a lesser-included and greater of-
fense relationship. Both crimes required proof that defendant, as a party to the offense, 
unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession 
of another from his person or immediate presence, against his will and by means of force 
or fear. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 and -302. For aggravated robbery, the state was 
required to establish an additional element as it related to the defendant: that "he use[d] or 
threatened] to use a dangerous weapon" in the commission of the robbery. Id. at -302. 
Where the elements for aggravated robbery and robbery overlap, Rosillo has 
established the first prong of the Baker analysis. 
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B. THE SECOND PART OF THE BAKER ANALYSIS IS ESTABLISHED: 
THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED A RATIONAL BASIS FOR THE JURY TO 
ACQUIT ROSILLO OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND TO CONVICT HIM 
OF ROBBERY, THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
Under the second prong of the "evidence-based" test, Utah appellate courts 
consider whether there is any rational basis in the evidence to allow the jury to acquit 
defendant of the greater charged offense and to convict him of the lesser offense. See 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785,790 (Utah 1984). Under this part of the test, this Court 
will not employ a sufficiency analysis to determine whether the state presented evidence 
to support the elements of the greater offense. In addition, this Court will not "weigh the 
credibility of the evidence, a Junction reserved for the trier of fact." Baker, 671 P.2d at 
159. Rather, this Court simply must decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of 
evidence presented to justify sending the lesser-included offense instruction to the jury, "a 
decision which must be made concerning all jury instructions in any trial." id. 
When the elements of two offenses overlap as discussed in the previous paragraph, 
if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a 
lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense. 
Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative 
interpretations, and one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense 
and conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must give a lesser 
included offense instruction at the request of the defendant. This situation will 
often arise when the critical question is either the credibility of certain evidence or 
the determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of the 
evidence. By assessing the evidence and deciding whether any interpretation of it 
would, if believed by the jury, permit conviction of the lesser offense and acquittal 
of the greater, the court preserves the weighing of evidence for the jury but is still 
able to protect the weighing process from frivolous "red herrings." 
Baker. 671 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added); see also Jones, 878 P.2d at 1177. 
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This Court will liberally construe the evidence presented at trial to determine 
whether there is any rational basis to support the defendant's case and the presentation of 
the lesser-included-offense instruction. 
The requirements of Baker for the inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction 
requested by the defendant should be liberally construed. "Society has a legitimate 
interest in the jury's freedom to act according to the evidence." People v. 
Chamblis, 395 Mich. 408, 426, 236 N.W.2d 473, 482 (1975), quoted in People v. 
Geiger, 35 Cal.3d 510, 523, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 52, 674 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1984). 
Where the defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included or a related 
offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence on which the jury 
could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given. State v. Crick, 
675 P.2d 527, 538 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The rule of Baker is not a 
mere technical rule designed to trip up judges and prosecutors. It serves a 
fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense 
that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor 
chooses to file and an acquittal. As we recognized in Baker, f,[w]here one of the 
elements of the offense charged remains in doubt but the defendant is plainly 
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of 
conviction." 671 P.2d at 157, quoting Keeble v. United States, All U.S. 205, 
212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1994, 36 LJEd.2d 844 (1973) (emphasis in original). 
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424; Jones, 878 P.2d at 1177 (court must view facts in light most 
favorable to defendant). 
In considering the evidence in this matter, the jury was instructed on the elements 
of aggravated robbery and party liability. The only difference between the charged 
offense as instructed (Le. aggravated robbery) and the lesser offense of robbery was the 
aggravating circumstance. According to Utah law, before the jury could convict Rosillo 
of aggravated robbery as a party to the offense, it was required to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that "he use[d] or threaten[ed] to use a dangerous weapon." Utah Code 
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Ann. §76-6-302(1 )(a). 
Under the accomplice liability provisions, that could be established with evidence 
that Rosillo directly committed an aggravated robbery, or he solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided Mallory in his conduct, which constituted 
the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. See Webb. 790 P.2d at 84 (to establish 
aggravated robbery as an accomplice, state must prove elements set forth at aggravated 
robbery statute and accomplice liability statute); Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123 (where a party 
did not actually engage in the shooting, the state was required to show that the party had 
requisite mental state for the charged offense, and that he directly committed the shooting, 
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the 
shooting). 
While the evidence in this case may have been sufficient to support a conviction 
for the greater offense of aggravated robbery, that is not the test for determining whether 
a quantum of evidence existed to support providing the jury with an instruction on the 
lesser-included offense of robbery. Indeed, as a matter of law and fact, the evidence here 
was susceptible of differing interpretations, one of which would support an acquittal on 
the aggravated robbery charge and a conviction on the lesser-included offense of robbery, 
as set forth below. 
1. As a Matter of Law, Even if the Jury Believed that an Aggravated Robbery 
Occurred, It Could Still Find that Rosillo Was Criminally Responsible Only for 
Robbery. 
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Under the law, it is possible to be a party to the greater offense, but to have the 
mental state and criminal responsibility only for the commission of the lesser offense. 
That is, Lund's testimony - that Rosillo twice requested money from Lund - is suscepti-
ble to alternative, reasonable interpretations: On the one hand, the evidence may support 
that Rosillo intentionally aided in Mallory's conduct (§ 76-2-202) in the use of a danger-
ous weapon for accomplice liability under the aggravated robbery statute; on the other 
hand, the evidence may support that Rosillo was not responsible for Mallory's conduct, 
but was otherwise guilty of a crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (to be liable for conduct 
of another, evidence must show defendant directly committed offense, or requested, com-
manded, solicited, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to engage in conduct). 
Under the latter interpretation, if the jury determined that Rosillo was not 
responsible for Mallory's conduct in using a gun, he would not be guilty of the 
aggravated robbery. He would be acquitted of that offense. Nevertheless, he may be 
criminally responsible for robbery as a result of his participation in the matter. 
By way of explanation, Utah law recognizes that both Rosillo and Mallory can be 
involved in the same criminal conduct, e.g. aggravated robbery, but have different mental 
states, making one person criminally responsible for the greater offense and the other 
person responsible for the lesser offense: 
Party liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in 
the criminal conduct have the same mental state. We wrote in State v. Crick, 675 
P.2d 527 (Utah 1983): 
A defendant can be criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but the 
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degree of his responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts that 
subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state of the actor. This is 
clear from the language of § 76-2-202. 
Id. at 534. Thus, three persons can be parties to the same criminal conduct and 
each have a different mental state. 
State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994) (emphasis in original) (recognizing 
accomplices may have different criminal intent in the commission of an offense; some 
parties may intend assault while other parties intend io kill victims). 
In this matter, while the jury could find that Rosillo committed robbery, it was not 
required under the law to attribute Mallory's conduct in using a gun to Rosillo. Here, the 
jury should have been allowed to consider (1) whether Rosillo was guilty of aggravated 
robbery under an accomplice liability theory, (2) whether an aggravated robbery occurred 
but Rosillo was criminally responsible only for robbery, and (3) whether Rosillo had no 
intent with respect to the criminal conduct and was therefore innocent. See Alvarez, 872 
P.2d at 461-62; see also Crick, 675 P.2d at 534. 
While the jury here did not choose the third alternative, we do not know from the 
record in this case whether the jury was forced to settle on the first alternative because it 
did not have a choice, or if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Rosillo was an 
accomplice to Mallory's conduct in using the dangerous weapon. "[W]hen the evidence 
is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative 
would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury question 
exists and the court must give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of 
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defendant." Baker. 671 P.2d at 159. 
Inasmuch as the law does not require the finder of fact to attribute the conduct and 
actions of Mallory to Rosillo, as a matter of law, the evidence here presented alternative 
interpretations, thereby creating a jury question as to "what inferences may legitimately 
be made." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. Under accomplice liability law, the jury would have a 
basis for acquitting Rosillo of aggravated robbery and convicting him of robbery. 
Since the evidence was "susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal" of aggravated robbery as it related to Rosillo and a 
conviction for robbery, the trial judge erred in failing to provide an instruction on the 
lesser included offense in this matter. The jury should have been permitted to determine 
defendant's guilt with the appropriate choices under the law. 
2. The Evidence Presented at Trial Supported That Rosillo Was Not an 
Accomplice to Mallory's Conduct Thereby Providing a Basis for Acquittal on the 
Aggravated Robbery Charge. 
In this case, Rosillo presented evidence to support the determination that he did not 
share in Mallory's conduct in committing the aggravated robbery; he was not an 
accomplice to that offense. Rosillo testified that he and Mallory left for the 7-Eleven 
convenience store to get something to eat in the early-morning hours. (R. 145:10.) As 
they began to walk toward the car wash, Mallory said, "Let's rob somebody," and he 
pulled something from his pants and approached Lund. (R. 145:11.) Rosillo realized 
Mallory had a gun when Lund turned around. (R. 145:12; 145:27.) Rosillo did not want 
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the matter to get out of hand and he did not want anyone to get hurt, so he did not do 
anything to defuse or exacerbate the situation. (R. 145:28; 145:31.) 
Rosillo testified that after Lund turned around, Mallory ordered Lund to hand over 
the money and wallet. (R. 145:29.) Lund handed those items to Rosillo, and Rosillo took 
them because he did not know what to do. Rosillo wanted to keep the situation calm. (R. 
145:14-15; see ajso R- 145:44 (Officer Carter did not recall that Rosillo admitted to 
taking the wallet).) Rosillo testified that he did not say anything during the encounter, 
and that Lund was mistaken when he identified Rosillo as the person who demanded the 
money. (R. 145:30; 145:44 (Officer Carter testified that after Rosillo was arrested, he 
informed officers he did not participate in the robbery).) 
After Rosillo and Mallory left the car wash, Mallory told Rosillo to give him the 
money. Rosillo complied. (R. 145:15.) When they arrived at the apartment, Rosillo told 
Mallory he would have to leave. Mallory went to a backroom to talk with his wife, and 
shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mallory emerged and gave $150 to Rosillo for rent. (R. 145:16.) 
The evidence presented by Rosillo supports an acquittal on the greater offense 
since Rosillo participated only out of fear and did not engage as a party in the use of the 
dangerous weapon. The evidence also supports a conviction on the lesser offense based 
on Rosillo's testimony that he participated in the matter, in that he unlawfully took the 
money from Lund. The unlawful taking was accomplished by "means" of "fear" (Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301) where Lund was confronted by two men at 2:00 in the morning on 
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a dark, empty street. Those facts support a conviction against Rosillo on the lesser 
offense of robbery. 
Lund's testimony provides further support for the lesser-included offense 
instruction. Lund stated that he may have been confused about the situation. Lund 
testified that during the entire encounter, the vacuum at the car wash continued to run 
beside him. (R. 144:32.) When he tried to recall within a short time of the incident (R. 
144:36) what was said that morning, he could not recall the exact words (R. 144:32-33; 
144:35-36), and he initially recalled that the suspects demanded money from him only 
once. (R. 144:35-36.) Also, Lund was initially confused as to whether Mallory or Rosillo 
demanded the money. (R. 144:38-39.) Lund ultimately settled on Rosillo as the person 
who made the demand. Lund also testified that he was not positive about the details. (R. 
144:40.) When Lund saw Rosillo and Mallory in police custody shortly after the robbery, 
he thought they looked alike. (R. 144:40.) Lund's testimony supports that he initially 
may have been confused about the matter. 
The evidence supports alternative interpretations. While Rosillo was involved in 
the robbery, he did not use a weapon, he did not aid Mallory in his use of the weapon, and 
he did not solicit, request, command or encourage the use of the weapon. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-202 (party liability). While Rosillo may have been aware of Mallory's use of 
a weapon, Rosillo's association with Mallory is not sufficient to attribute Mallory's con-
duct to Rosillo. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980) (mere presence during 
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or prior knowledge of criminal activity does not make person an accomplice of another's 
acts, unless that person advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in the conduct); (see also 
R. 103; 108 (while jury was advised it must not be concerned with Mallory, the jury was 
given only one choice with respect to conviction, and that was to find Rosillo guilty of 
Mallory's conduct).) The facts support alternative interpretations that the jury should 
have been allowed to consider with the appropriate choices and instructions. 
This case is similar to State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421. There, defendant Hansen 
and co-defendant Rocco went to David Stewart's house, hog-tied him, and stole several 
items of personal property. The house was then set on fire. Id. at 422. Stewart died from 
the burns and carbon monoxide poisoning. Id 
The defendants drove to a second person's house, tied him up, stole his property 
and set his house on fire. The second victim escaped. Jd. Defendant Hansen ultimately 
was charged with capital homicide for the death of Stewart. Id 
At trial, the state presented evidence to support that defendant committed robbery, 
burglary, and arson, and that he intentionally/knowingly killed Stewart during the arson. 
See id. at 422-23. 
In his defense, defendant Hansen testified that he held a gun on Stewart and tied 
him up, and he stole property from Stewart. He also testified that while he was searching 
the house for property, he became aware that Rocco had set it on fire. Hansen panicked 
and fled the house without helping Stewart. In addition, Hansen denied that he was an 
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accomplice to the arson and he denied that he shared Rocco's intent or knowledge that 
Stewart would be killed as a result of the fire. Id, at 422-23. "His theory was that his 
intentional conduct only involved tying up Stewart during the course of the 
burglary/robbery and that the failure to untie Stewart, although the cause of Stewart's 
death, was a result of panic after discovery of the fire rather than an intent to kill 
Stewart." Id at 423. 
At the conclusion of trial, the defense proposed an instruction on the lesser-
included offense of felony murder. Id. at 423. The instruction was consistent with 
"Hansen's theory that he did not knowingly or intentionally kill Stewart, but was guilty 
only of an unintentional killing that occurred during the course of a robbery or burglary." 
Id. The trial court rejected the defendant's instruction but did provide two other lesser-
included-offense instructions, "one that did cover felony-murder, but was premised on an 
unintentional killing occurring during the course of an aggravated arson, and another on 
manslaughter, premised on an unintentional killing occurring as a result of a recklessly set 
fire." Id The jury instructions also described the criteria for holding a person 
responsible as an accomplice for crimes committed by the principal. I d 
After deliberations, the jury convicted Hansen of capital murder. He appealed, 
claiming the trial court erred in failing to provide his requested lesser-included-offense 
instruction for felony-murder, "which would have permitted the jury to find him guilty of 
an unintentional killing that occurred in the commission of robbery, aggravated robbery, 
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burglary, or aggravated burglary." id. 
In reversing the case, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
As a factual matter, there is no question that Stewart was tied up at the time the fire 
was set and that his death was caused by the fire, nor is there any real question that 
either Hansen or Rocco deliberately set the fire. Realistically speaking, then, 
under the facts presented to the jury, whoever was found responsible for setting the 
fire almost certainly would have to be found to have at least "knowingly" killed 
Stewart and, therefore, be convicted of an intentional killing committed during the 
course of a felony. Conversely, one found not responsible for the fire would have 
to be acquitted of all charges. The jury was never given the choice of finding that 
Hansen was not responsible for the fire, yet was still guilty of a felony during 
which an unintentional killing occurred. Its only choice was to find that he was 
responsible for the fire that caused the death or to acquit him altogether. This is 
exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included offense instructions are 
designed to avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not have had to make 
if Hansen's burglary or robbery-based felony-murder instruction had been given. 
Therefore, we cannot find that the refusal to give the instruction was harmless. We 
must reverse and remand for a new trial. 
Hansen. 734 P.2d at 428. 
As in Hansen, the evidence in Rosillo's case is susceptible of alternative 
interpretations, one of which supports an acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge for 
Rosillo and a conviction for robbery. Rosillo took money and a wallet from Lund when 
Lund handed the property over. 
However, Rosillo was not involved in using or threatening Lund with a weapon. 
He did not directly use the weapon, and he did not solicit such use, request it, command 
it, encourage it, or intentionally aid in the use of the weapon. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-202; Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123 (under accomplice liability statute for attempted 
homicide, where a party did not actually engage in the shooting, the state was required to 
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show that the party both had the required mental state for the charged offense, and 
directly committed the shooting, or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided in committing the shooting); (R. 105 (jury instructed on party 
liability)). The jury was required to resolve conflicts in the evidence concerning Rosillo's 
level of participation. 
In resolving those conflicts, the jury was never given the choice of finding that 
Rosillo was not an accomplice to the aggravated robbery, and thus not criminally 
responsible for use of the weapon, yet was still guilty as a result of his participation in the 
matter. The jury was given only the choice to convict Rosillo of first-degree aggravated 
robbery or to acquit. "This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included offense 
instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not have had 
to make" if the trial judge had provided the requested lesser-included offense instruction. 
See Hansen. 734 P.2d at 428. 
Rosillo has met the second part of the Baker analysis. He was entitled to an 
instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery, and to a verdict form for the jury on 
that lesser offense in order that the jury could deliberate the evidence in light of the 
reasonable alternative inferences and informed choices. 
C. THE ERROR HERE WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
In State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although 
defendant was able to satisfy both prongs of the Baker analysis, the trial court's failure to 
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present the lesser-included offense instruction to the jury did not warrant reversal of the 
matter because the error was "harmless." Id. at ^ |20. 
We agree with defendant that the Baker requirements were satisfied and that the 
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of 
attempted manslaughter. However, we hold that this error was harmless. As we 
have previously explained, harmless error is an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome 
of the proceedings. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997). Put 
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict. Id. 
Evans, 2001 UT 22, |20. 
The prejudice analysis seems to consider whether the state's evidence supporting 
the greater offense was so overwhelming that it would be asking too much of the jury to 
consider defendant's theory in the context of the requested lesser-included-offense 
instruction. See Id. at ^23. Stated another way, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected 
defendant's lesser-included-offense instruction when the defendant has presented 
relatively minor evidence for the lesser offense compared to the state's overwhelming 
evidence supporting the charged offense. 
The following cases illustrate application of the harmless-error doctrine in the 
context of a defendant's request for a lesser-included-offense instruction. 
In Evans, the evidence presented at trial consisted of the following: On August 15, 
1997, three undercover officers in street clothes initiated a traffic stop of defendant's 
Monte Carlo when they observed, among other things, defendant and the passengers 
passing around a bottle of alcohol. Evans. 2001 UT 22, lfl|2-3. While the officers were in 
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two separate, unmarked cars, each officer testified that their cars were equipped with 
sirens and various emergency lights in the grill and taillights, the windshield visor area, 
and side markers. Also, the officers testified that to initiate the stop of defendant's car, 
the officers engaged their emergency equipment. Id. at ffl) 2-3, 10. 
After the officers had completed the stop, Officer Idle got out of his car and began 
to approach Evans' car. When Officer Idle "had taken about three steps, the driver's side 
door of the Monte Carlo opened, and defendant emerged holding a rifle. Defendant 
immediately began firing at Officer Idle." Id. at [^4. 
According to the evidence, defendant discharged several bullets, hitting Office Idle 
seven times. See id. at ^|5. Defendant then got back into his car and led officers on a 
chase. When he was finally arrested, the state charged Evans with three counts of first-
degree-felony attempted aggravated murder for firing at law enforcement officers, and 
one count of failing to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third-degree felony 
offense. Id. at^ {8. 
At trial, defendant requested lesser-included offense instructions on attempted 
manslaughter. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, defendant argued the trial 
court erred in failing to provide the instructions where defendant had presented evidence 
to support an "imperfect legal justification" under the attempted manslaughter provisions. 
Id. at ^ jl9. Defendant testified that he did not know he was shooting at officers because 
he did not see their emergency equipment during the traffic stop. Defendant claimed that 
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he began to fire because he saw a stranger in street clothes (Officer Idle) walking toward 
him with a gun. See id. at ^ |19. 
In considering the matter on appeal, the supreme court ruled that while defendant 
satisfied both prongs of the Baker analysis, the trial court's error in failing to provide the 
lesser-included offense instruction was harmless. "In this case, the State offered 
testimony from several witnesses that contradicted defendant's sole testimony that he did 
not realize he had been pulled over by or had shot a police officer." Id. at ^21. 
Passengers from defendant's car testified that defendant exclaimed prior to the traffic 
stop that they were being pulled over. In addition, the passengers knew they were being 
pulled over by police. The three officers and passers-by also testified that the officers had 
emergency equipment engaged during the stop. Id. at ^21. 
Several witnesses testified that the emergency lights were clearly visible on the 
officers' cars during the traffic stop. "Only the testimony of defendant, that he was 
unaware that the driver of the car pursuing him was an officer, stands counter to this 
evidence. He offers no explanation as to how he saw Officer Idle, gun in hand, standing 
in front of the police car with its red and blue flashing lights, but failed to see the lights 
when looking carefully enough to see the gun in the officer's hand." Id at f 22. 
According to the court, "[defendant asks much of the jury." "[W]e conclude that it was 
harmless error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense 
of attempted manslaughter." Id. at ^ [23. 
27 
In Kruger, defendant was charged and convicted of felony murder. He appealed 
and argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the 
lesser-included offense of manslaughter where the evidence supported that he committed 
the offense recklessly or under an extreme emotional disturbance. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 
If 1. The supreme court ruled that defendant failed to present a sufficient quantum of 
evidence to justify an acquittal on the greater offense of felony murder and a conviction 
on the lesser offense of manslaughter. Id. at 11^ 15-17. 
Specifically, four witnesses testified that Kruger admitted to shooting the victim 
during the course of a robbery. Id. at 1J19. One witness testified that Kruger had a habit 
generally of exaggerating. Id. Under those circumstances, the court ruled that ff[g]iven 
the totality of the evidence and facts of this case, no reasonable jury could disregard the 
testimony of four witnesses to whom Kruger confessed that he attempted to rob Garcia, 
just because Anne testified that Kruger often fantasized and exaggerated generally. 
Thus, there is not a rational basis in the evidence to acquit Kruger of felony murder." Id 
In Baker, the defendant argued he was entitled to a lesser-included offense 
instruction for criminal trespass. Baker. 671 P.2d at 154. According to the facts, 
defendant was found in a storage closet of a locked building; he did not deny breaking 
into the gas station or forcibly opening a locked desk. Defendant was charged with 
burglary. On appeal, he argued he was too intoxicated to form intent and the jury should 
have been instructed on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. Id at 159. 
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The supreme court found that the only evidence from the defense in support of the 
intoxication theory was the testimony of defendant's friend. The friend testified ,fthat the 
defendant was stopped by police while driving the friend home, that the police asked the 
defendant to get out of the truck, that they talked with him and smelled his breath but did 
not give him the field sobriety test, allowing him instead to get back into his truck and 
drive away." id. According to the court, 
the only evidence of intoxication showed that the defendant was not seriously 
enough incapacitated by his drinking to cause the police to give him field sobriety 
tests. This is not a sufficient quantum of evidence to warrant an instruction 
regarding the defendant's capacity to form an intent. Even if it were, the 
defendant's theory would not support the giving of an instruction on criminal 
trespass, an offense which itself requires a specific intent. The thrust of the 
defendant's evidence on intoxication was to negate any specific intent at all, not to 
prove the existence of one of the intents necessary for criminal trespass. See State 
v. Hendricks, supra, at 634. 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 160. 
In this matter, the victim Steven Lund testified that he observed two men standing 
next to each other, Mallory, who held a gun, and Rosillo. (R. 144:15-16.) According to 
Lund, Rosillo twice ordered him to hand over his property. (R. 144:17-18.) Lund handed 
his money then wallet to Rosillo, who placed the items in his pocket. (R. 144:17-19.) 
Lund also testified that initially he was confused about the matter and could not recall 
what the suspects said (R. 144:32-33; 144:35), he initially recalled that the suspects 
demanded money from him only once (R. 144:35-36), and he initially was confused as to 
whether the suspect who wore the bright blue sweatshirt demanded the money (Mallory) 
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or whether it was the other suspect. (R. 144:38.) Lund also thought Mallory and Rosillo 
looked alike. (R. 144:40.) 
Both Rosillo and Lund testified that at all times Mallory had control and exclusive 
possession of the gun. In addition, Lund did not observe the men as they approached him 
from behind. Thus, Lund's testimony did not contradict evidence that Mallory initiated 
the robbery on his own and pulled the gun out at the last minute, while Rosillo became 
involved only to keep things calm. 
Rosillo testified that he took the money and wallet from Lund because he felt he 
did not have a choice. (R. 145:15.) He was afraid that Mallory might shoot somebody if 
Rosillo did not accept the money from Lund, and Rosillo wanted to keep things calm. (R. 
145:15; 145:19; 145:31.) 
The lesser-included-offense instruction for robbery in this case does not ask too 
much of the jury. It is not like Evans or Kruger where the defendant's testimony in those 
cases was in conflict with an overwhelming amount of evidence from numerous other 
witnesses. Rather, in this case, the trial came down to a credibility judgment; in relevant 
respects the evidence came down to the word of the key prosecution witness against the 
word of the defendant, where Lund testified that Rosillo demanded money and the wallet, 
and Rosillo testified that Lund was mistaken in identifying him as making the demands. 
In other respects, Rosillo's testimony regarding the matter was uncontested or was 
consistent with Lund's, where Rosillo testified that Mallory had the gun, Mallory initiated 
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the robbery, Rosillo participated out of fear and to keep the situation calm, and Rosillo 
was not aware the Mallory had a gun until Lund turned around and Mallory demanded the 
money. In this case, given the evidence, the jury should have been allowed to consider 
the matter in light of the appropriate instructions and choices, including the instruction for 
the lesser-included offense of robbery. 
In addition, this case is not like Baker where the defendant there was trading one 
criminal intent for another. Indeed, it is distinguishable from Baker. In the context of 
this case, where the state presented an accomplice liability theory, the law recognizes that 
parties to an offense may have criminal intent to commit different offenses. That is, 
while one party may intend to assault the victim, another party may intend to kill the 
victim. Each party may be found responsible for the other's conduct, but only to the 
degree of his own mental state. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461-62 (while evidence supported 
criminal intent, some parties may have intended assault while others intended death); 
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428 (while evidence supported different theories of aggravated 
murder and felony murder, under the accomplice liability theory defendant was entitled to 
have his theory presented to the jury: that he intended to commit burglary and robbery, 
but did not intend death, thereby supporting felony murder); Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123 
(under accomplice liability statute where a party did not actually engage in the shooting, 
the state was required to show that the party both had the required mental state for the 
charged offense, and he directly committed the shooting, or solicited, requested, 
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commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the shooting). 
In this case, Rosillo maintained that he did not commit the aggravated robbery. 
Thus, the only question was the degree of his liability. The jury here deliberated the 
evidence for hours, likely struggling to make some sense of the limited choices they were 
provided. (R. 145:85; 146 (jury began deliberations at 1:20 p.m. on November 29, and 
came to a verdict on November 30); R. 105; 103; 108 (jury instructed on accomplice 
liability and that it could not consider Mallory's conduct in deliberating case against 
Rosillo; jury also instructed to either acquit or to find Rosillo guilty of aggravated robbery 
for use of a dangerous weapon).) 
In other contexts, where the standard of review does not require the court to 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense, see Kruger. 2000 UT 60, 
T[14 (in considering defendant's requested lesser-included-offense instruction, court must 
"view the evidence and the inferences that can be draw from it in the light most favorable 
to the defense"), Utah appellate courts have refused to find "harmless" error where the 
jury was required to resolve conflicts in the issues, particularly as they related to the 
defendant's credibility. State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Trov. 688 P.2d 483,486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400,403 (Utah 
1986) (when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, court 
is less likely to find harmless error). Since the evidence in this case on the critical, 
aggravated element was in conflict and required the jury to resolve issues concerning 
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accomplice liability and defendant's credibility, the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defense supported providing the jury with the instruction on the lesser-
included offense of robbery. This Court should find that the refusal to give the 
instruction was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Rosillo respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing this case for a new trial 
where Rosillo may present an instruction to the jury on the lesser offense of robbery. 
SUBMITTED this&^day of Q - * • , 2001. 
LINDA M. JONES (J 
LISA J. REMAL 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
C a s e N o : 0 0 1 9 1 4 6 7 0 FS 
J u d g e : TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
D a t e : J a n u a r y 1 2 , 2 0 0 1 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN 
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : REMAL, LISA J, 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 21, 1977 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/30/2000 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
(W&^us^
 l/n/amt SuLd!^ W\ WJh* 
Case No: 001914670 
Date: Jan 12, 2001 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Credit granted for 146 days served in this/matter, 
firearm enhance has been applied to this eia.se. 
A one year 
AfUTj 
V 
Dated this /jp^ day of <^ ?3M<-<^ **frtA^  20^/ eo// 
?IMOTHY R. DNj 
District CourtJudge 
Paae 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
76-6-301. Robbery-
CD A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery* 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
ADDENDUM C 
FIUJ DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judioial District 
NOV n 2000 
COUNTY 
j Deputy Clark t  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 001914670 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY . The Information alleges: 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 3 00 South 3 00 
East, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 18, 
2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JESUS ISREAL 
ROSILLO, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took 
personal property in the possession of Steve Lund from the person 
or immediate presence of Steve Lund, and in the course of 
committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous 
weapon, to wit: a gun. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a 
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded 
by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations of the 
Information. The mere fact that the defendant stands charged with 
an offense is not to be taken by you as any evidence of his guilt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant has 
entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each 
and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained in the 
Inf ormation and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and 
all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has 
been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to the 
charge by a committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his guilt 
and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by you in 
determining his guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *? 
It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law 
applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow 
the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are 
presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this court 
and the defendant's plea of Mnot guilty.11 This duty you should 
perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion or 
prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be biased 
against the defendant because of the fact that he has been arrested 
for this offense, or because an Information has been filed against 
him, or because he has been brought before the court to stand 
trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you are 
not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them that 
he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in 
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you 
to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. Both the State of 
Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand 
and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately 
consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that 
you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences 
of such verdict may be. The verdict must express the individual 
opinion of each juror. 
INSTRUCTION NO. L& 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon 
to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be 
admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons for such 
rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether 
offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of law. In 
admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I do not 
determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor do I pass 
on the credibility of the witness. You are not to consider 
evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out. 
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must 
not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the 
reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO, H 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile 
such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict 
cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine 
from the evidence what the facts are. There are no definite rules 
governing how you shall determine the weight or convincing force of 
any evidence, or how you shall determine what the facts in this 
case are. But you should carefully and conscientiously consider 
and compare all of the testimony, and all of the facts and 
circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine 
therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all 
that the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of 
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing in 
view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. You may 
believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer 
number in accordance with your honest convictions. The testimony 
of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter is 
naturally less convincing on other matters. So if you believe a 
witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in 
this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such 
witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it is entitled 
to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. % 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts 
of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base 
their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant, 
provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, 
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must 
carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as 
circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendants favor, but respects each for 
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person fs conduct at any time in question 
consists of the testimony of every witness who perceived such 
conduct and which describes or relates what was perceived. All 
other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation 
to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, statement or 
other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by 
reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it 
may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION MO. 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss 
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment. The court and 
other governmental agencies are responsible for deciding those 
issues. Accordingly, the subject of penalty or punishment must not 
in any way affect your decision as to the innocence or guilt of the 
defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ b 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of 
counsel made during the t r i a l , unless such statement was made as 
a s t i p u l a t i o n conceding the exis tence of a fact or fac ts . 
INSTRUCTION NO. \V 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In a case of a reasonable 
doubt as to whether his guilt has been satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Statefs evidence must obviate all 
reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based upon reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or lack 
of evidence in this case. A reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt 
that is merely fanciful or imaginary or is based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which 
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable 
doubt. A determination that a criminal defendant has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason, 
impartiality, and common sense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \~2-
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of 
the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to 
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result of 
the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, 
if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' deportment upon 
the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their 
apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity 
to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to 
remember. You should consider these matters together with all of 
the other facts and circumstances which you may believe have a 
bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses1 
statement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. V3 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness 
in his own behalf and his testimony should be received and given 
the same consideration as you give to that of any other witness. 
The fact that he stands accused of a crime is no evidence of his 
guilt and is no reason for rejecting his testimony. However, you 
should weigh his testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of 
any other witness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. VA 
One may attempt to impeach a witness by showing that on some 
former occasion the witness made a statement or statements that 
were contradictory of the witness' testimony here. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \<5 
Although there is more than one person involved in this 
action, the case against each person is separate from and 
independent of the case of the other. In this case only one 
person is on trial. You are not to concern yourselves with the 
status of any other person involved in this action. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (j? 
Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful 
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, that 
person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon, either directly 
or as a party to the crime. 
INSTRUCTION NO. | r l 
Every person, ac t ing with the mental s t a t e required for the 
commission of the offense who d i rec t ly commits the offense, who 
s o l i c i t s , r e q u e s t s , commands, encourages, or i n t en t iona l ly aids 
another person to engage in conduct which cons t i tu t e s an offense 
shal l be c r imina l ly l i a b l e as a party for such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. V % 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of 
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state 
of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \°\ 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to 
the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not 
be proven. The motive of an accused is immaterial except 
insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of 
state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus Isreal Rosillo, of 
the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the Information, 
you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 18th day of August, 2 000, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Jesus Isreal Rosillo, 
took personal property then in the possession of Steve Lund, from 
the person or immediate presence of Steve Lund; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Steve Lund; and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, the 
defendant was aware a dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this 
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the 
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. -D\ 
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized 
by law, or, without legal justification, or, illegal. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result 
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
"Personal property" means anything of value, and includes 
money. 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. -3^ 
In determining any fact in this case you should not consider 
nor be influenced by any statement made or act done by me which you 
may interpret as indicating my views thereon. You are the sole and 
final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you 
must determine such questions for yourselves from the evidence, 
without regard to what you believe my opinions may be. I have not 
intended to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any 
opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or 
what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what my 
views may be. You must follow your own views. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 03> 
The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the 
individual opinion of each juror. It is the duty of each of you 
after considering all the evidence in the case, to determine, if 
possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
When you have reached a conclusion in that respect, you should not 
change it merely because one or more or all of your fellow jurors 
may have come to a different conclusion. However, each juror 
should freely and fairly discuss with his fellow jurors the 
evidence and the deduction to be drawn therefrom. If, after doing 
so, any juror should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached 
by him was wrong, he unhesitatingly should abandon that original 
opinion and render his verdict according to his final decision. 
INSTRUCTION MO. 2 ^ 
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none 
must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, 
and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions 
as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION MO. 
The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying 
all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just 
and lawful verdict. The applicability of some of these 
instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach as to what 
the facts are. As to any such instruction, the fact that it has 
been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court 
and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts 
are. If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you 
find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. <^ l* 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their 
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. It is 
rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, 
to make an emphatic expression of an opinion on the case or to 
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one 
does that at the outset, a sense of pride may be aroused, and one 
may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this 
matter, but are judges. The final test of the quality of your 
service will lie in the verdict which you return to the court, not 
in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind 
that you will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial 
administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that 
end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in the 
jury room there can be no triumph except the ascertainment and 
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice. 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^T) 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 
Guilty of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, as 
charged in the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in 
writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this/court. When your 
verdict has been found, notify the bailiff/that you are ready to 
report to the court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
rUDGE 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus Israel Rosillo, of the offense of Robbery, a 
lesser included offense, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 18th day of August, 2000, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Jesus Israel Rosillo, took personal property then in the possession of Steve Lund, 
from the person or immediate presence of Steve Lund; and 
2..That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Steve Lund; and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced that 
the state has proven each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you should find the defendant guilty of Robbery, a lesser included offense. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced that the state has proven each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. 
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